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ABSTRACT 
The development in the area of wireless communication, mobile and 
embedded computing leads to significant changes in the application of 
devices. Over the last years, embedded devices were brought into the 
consumer area creating the Internet of Things. Furthermore, industrial 
applications increasingly rely on communication through trust 
boundaries. Networking is cheap and easily applicable while providing 
the possibility to make everyday life more easy and comfortable and 
industry more efficient and less time-consuming. One of the crucial 
parts of this interconnected world is sound and secure authentication of 
entities. Only entities with valid authorisation should be enabled to act 
on a resource according to an access control scheme. An overview of 
challenges and practices of authentication is provided in this work, with 
a special focus on context information as part of security solutions. It 
can be used for authentication and security solutions in industrial 
applications. Additional information about events in networks can aid 
intrusion detection, especially in combination with security 
information and event management systems. Finally, an authentication 
and access control approach, based on context information and - 
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depending on the scenario - multiple factors is presented. The 
combination of multiple factors with context information makes it 
secure and at the same time case adaptive, so that the effort always 
matches, but never exceeds, the security demand. This is a common 
issue of standard cyber security, entities having to obey strict, inflexible 
and unhandy policies. This approach has been implemented exemplary 
based on RADIUS. Different scenarios were considered, showing that 
this approach is capable of providing flexible and scalable security for 
authentication processes. 
 
Keyword: Authentication, Context awareness, Industrial Internet of Things, 
Multi-factor authentication, Computer network 
 
 
1 Introduction 
Interconnectivity, characterised by ad-hoc access to computing 
systems, is a property of the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). 
Network- and cloud-based resources, in addition to mobile and 
handheld computing, motivate a paradigm shift in authentication and 
access control. In the consumer area, users want to access the same 
resource from different devices in different places with connections 
that break trust boundaries. Furthermore, access rights should be 
transferred between different devices. In the industrial area, users want 
to access different production entities and networks without re-
authentication. Access rights should be traversed as well, from one 
accessed device in a certain network to another. These requirements are 
easy to fulfill with standard means. However, with the increase in 
interconnected devices, network-based crime has drastically increased 
as well. Several recent and not-so-recent botnets aimed at IoT-devices, 
like the infamous Mirai-botnet (Antonkakis et al. 2017), or its 
successor, the Satori-botnet (Paganini 2018). In addition to that, the 
industrial landscape is becoming more and more of a target for cyber 
attacks (Duque Anton et al. 2017a). Cyber crime has a greater revenue 
than drug trafficking since 2009 (Dethlefs 2015; Symantec 2009). This 
trend creates demand for strong authentication and access control, as it 
is the foundation of any further interaction and needs to be fulfilled in 
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order to meet any other security objectives (Schaefer 2016). At the 
same time, typing a strong user name and password-combination on a 
cell phone, for example, is bothersome and inflexible. Authentication 
should be easy to use and at the same time secure. Additionally, 
connectivity through trust boundaries and heterogeneous networks 
demand for novel kinds of intrusion detection. Many industrial 
protocols do not contain means for encryption or authentication by 
default. 
 
The contribution of this work consists of two parts: First, providing 
sound and secure authentication, based on information about 
circumstances, so-called situational awareness is addressed in this 
work in Section 3. Current research areas, challenges and solutions for 
authentication are evaluated in Section 5. Second, an exemplary 
implementation of a context-based authentication system is 
implemented and evaluated, derived of a use case that fits both classic 
home and office networks, as well as industrial applications. 
 
The remainder of this work is structured as follows: A short overview 
of existing authentication methods is provided in Section 2. Section 3 
provides a concept for integration of situational awareness into 
authentication. The proposed approach is presented in Section 4 and 
evaluated with three scenarios. In Section 5, an overview of current 
research in the field of multi-factor and context-based authentication 
and authorization is given. Future research directions are presented in 
Section 6, this work is concluded in Section 7. 
 
 
2 Authentication in a Nutshell 
The process of authentication can be divided into three steps:  
– Identification,  
– Authentication and  
– Authorisation.  
  
4 
In the first step, identification, an entity makes an assertion about who 
it claims to be. In the next step, authentication2, this assertion is 
evaluated. Lastly, after establishing the identity, access rights are 
granted accordingly in the authorisation phase. These three steps are 
summarised in this section. First, identification is discussed in 
Subsection 3.1. There are several well-established and commonly used 
authentication mechanisms. According to Turner, they can be divided 
into three different kinds of authentication factors, as described in 
Subsection 3.2 and four different types of authentication procedures 
(Turner 2016), as presented in Subsection 3.3. The authentication 
mechanisms presented here are used for authentication of human users. 
In contrast to human users, machines and services can be users that 
need authentication in IIoT scenarios as well. Finally, authorisation is 
discussed in Subsection 3.5 
 
 
2.1 Identification Process 
The identification of an entity is the first step of the authentication 
process. Only if an authentication provider knows the identity of a 
given entity, the according access rights can be assigned. Access rights 
of a given entity must only be granted to this entity (Schneier 2000). In 
order to do so, an identity is first requested. The entity makes a claim 
about its identity. In order to evaluate this claim, the entity has to be 
known to the authentication provider beforehand. Otherwise, it must 
register. Methods to make a claim about an identity are usernames, but 
can also be extended to barcodes, Radio Frequency Identification 
(RFID) token or Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) and Trusted 
Platform Modules (TPMs) that are integral to smartcards (International 
Organization for Standardization 2011). Furthermore, there are use 
cases where it is necessary to authenticate entities that have not been 
previously known to the authentication provider, called Plug & Trust 
(Ambekar et al. 2012) or Trust On First Use (TOFU) (Gultsch 2016). 
The identification and authentication methods for such use cases are 
based on properties that can be verified without prior knowledge of the 
specific entity. 
                                                 
2 Authentication is used ambiguously in this work, describing the process of proving 
an identity as well as the whole process 
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2.2  Authentication Factors 
The different authentication factors can be grouped as follows: 
– Knowledge factors, 
– Possession factors and 
– Inherence factors. 
This differentiation is used to categorise authentication factors of 
human entities. In the context of IIoT, machines often need to 
authenticate to services or other machines. The differentiation between 
these factors, however, is different than that of humans. Concepts, such 
as knowledge and possession, do not work for machines. 
 
Knowledge factors are most commonly used in form of passwords or 
Personal Identification Numbers (PINs). They prove the identity of a 
user by providing knowledge that, by default, only the given user 
should have. They are usually easy to change in case they are 
compromised. Given the handling is done in a secure manner by the 
service provider requesting the passwords, they are relatively secure. 
Good handling includes storage as salted hashes only and encrypted 
transmission. On the downside, remembering passwords is tedious, 
especially if a user has to remember many of them. So-called key-
managers for mobile- and desktop-systems, such as LastPass 
(LogMeIn 2018), increase the usability. 
 
Possession factors are used to prove the identity of a user with a certain 
item only the user should have. Common examples are RSA SecureID 
(RSA Security LLC 2018) or ID cards, for example by Siemens (2013). 
One Time Passwords (OTPs) (Haller et al. 1998) can be considered a 
combination of knowledge and possession factor. They contain a secret 
that cannot be extracted by an attacker and are usually very secure. 
Furthermore, their loss is easily detected, so a compromise of security 
can be detected in a timely manner. In contrast to that, if a password 
has been cracked, the user has no way of knowing. 
 
Inherence factors are usually associated with biometric information, 
such as finger prints or retina scans. This kind of factor is meant to be 
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used to unambiguously identify a user. It is a characteristic that cannot 
be changed. The most prevalent disadvantage lies in the fact that, once 
compromised, this factor can never be used again, as it is fixed for the 
lifetime of a user. That means, once the biometric factor of a person is 
publicly available, forgeries can be made with sufficient effort. 
Prominent examples are the forgery of German chancellor Dr. Angela 
Merkel’s retina scan and German Secretary of Defense, Dr. Ursula von 
der Leyen’s finger prints (Krempl 2014). Both replicas were made 
solely from pictures that were published in press releases. This 
impressively shows the dangers of inherence factors. 
 
 
2.3  Types of Authentication 
According to Turner, four different types of authentication can be 
distinguished (Turner 2016). In contrast to the authentication factors 
describing how authentication is performed, authentication types 
describe the combination of different factors. They are listed below in 
order of increasing security: 
– Single-factor authentication 
– Two-factor authentication 
– Multi-factor authentication 
– Strong authentication 
Single-factor authentication is based on one authentication factor, e.g. 
a password or PIN. If this factor is flawed, the approach does not 
provide security. Two-factor authentication takes two authentication 
factors in order to determine the identity of a user. It is harder to break, 
as two factors need to be compromised. However, if the required input 
is based on the same factor, e.g. a possession factor like an Identifier 
(ID) badge, this approach is only as secure as the given factor. Multi-
factor authentication is based on a multitude of factors, but at least 
three. As with two-factor authentication, if the input is based on the 
same factor, the mechanism is only as secure as the given factor. Strong 
authentication is two- or multi-factor authentication, but with so-called 
strong factors. Strong factors must not depend on other factors used by 
the authentication process. Furthermore, they must be designed in a 
fashion that they cannot be generated by an attacker with knowledge of 
the authentication process.  
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2.4  Context as a Factor 
Context information can be considered as an authentication factor. It 
provides information about the status of an entity, therefore it can be 
used as a factor or increase the measure of trust (Bhatti et al. 2004; 
Hulsebosch et al. 2005; Lenzini 2009). Location information can be 
used to determine whether a user is within a perimeter. If not it is less 
likely that the user is affiliated with the company owning the perimeter. 
In the same way time can be a factor. Enterprises have common 
working hours during which access requests to resources are common. 
If a request occurs outside those hours, the credibility of the requesting 
entity is lower. Another application of context is access control based 
on necessity and emergency. One possible application of access control 
is granting entry to locked doors for emergency systems only if an 
alarm was triggered. Choi et al. consider context for risk-based access 
to sensitive medical information (Choi et al. 2015). 
 
 
2.5  Authorisation Schemes 
Authorisation and access control describe the process of granting rights 
to entities, once their identities have been confirmed. Depending on the 
access control policies, different users or types of users have certain 
permissions in a network. Access control and authorisation inherently 
only works with secure and strong authentication. If there is no 
possibility to reliably determine the identity of a user, access control 
and authentication are of no value. According to Musa, there are four 
general types of access control (Musa 2014): 
– Mandatory Access Control (MAC) 
– Discretionary Access Control (DAC) 
– Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) 
– Rule-Based Access Control 
MAC grants access rights and permissions based on strict schemes that 
arise from user level and the classification of data. DAC allows the 
owner of the data to specifically grant rights for each individual user. 
RBAC distributes access rights and permissions based on the role of the 
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user. Each user is assigned one role, which has different rights for 
different types of data and different permissions for several actions. 
Rule-Based Access Control allows granting permissions based on some 
rules that can also relate to environment and context information. 
 
 
3 Concept for Context Integration  
The main changes brought to industry in the course of the IIoT are 
based on an increase of connectivity and the distribution of 
computations. In the beginning of Supervisory Control And Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) systems, industrial networks were physically 
separated from public networks access to devices had to be obtained 
either locally or by using dedicated control terminals. Now, operators 
often switch between machines and tasks often, sometimes access is 
requested from remote locations. Due to the availability of resources 
over public networks, strong authentication is required. On the other 
hand, strong authentication is often tedious to use for human operators. 
Common authentication mechanisms are presented in Section 2. The 
concept proposed in this work is based on two aspects. First, the 
strength of authentication is dependent on the action that is requested. 
E.g. if an operator aims to perform security critical tasks, such as 
reconfiguration of a device, a stronger authentication is required than 
if the operator only requests to read status information. Second, 
situational awareness is taken into account to evaluate the risk of a 
request. In practice, local access can be deemed safer than remote 
access, as local access requires physical presence that is enforced by 
physical security. In addition to that, time of the request provides 
information of its soundness. Requests during working hours are very 
probable while requests during off time are less likely, but still 
possible. In taking this into account, the strength of authentication can 
be adapted dynamically. The scheme is pictured in Figure 1. Context 
variables describe the circumstance of a request, providing situational 
awareness. The authentication methods are inherent to a requester. A 
validator decides upon the strength of authentication required based on 
the situation and the requested action or resource. An exemplary 
implementation of this system is presented in the subsequent section. 
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4 A Dynamic Model 
In this section, the use case is described in the Subsection 4.1. The 
architecture is presented in Subsection 4.2, followed by the evaluation 
in Subsection 4.3 and a discussion in Subsection 4.4. 
 
 
FIGURE 1: AUTHENTICATION CONCEPT 
 
 
4.1  Use Case 
The use case evaluated in this work is exemplary for existing 
requirements in industrial and office network requirements. It focusses 
on user access to resources under different circumstances with requests 
to perform a set of actions. The action can either be a request for default 
or for root access to a resource. The situational awareness is derived 
from information about time and location, where location is obtained 
from the IP address. This means a user can either be inside a trusted 
network, or not. The time can either be during common working hours 
or not. If a user requests any action, default or root, outside the trusted 
network or outside common working hours, high security is required. 
High security means two factors in the course of the implementation 
presented in this work. If a user requests default access during normal 
working hours and from inside a trusted network, the situation is 
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deemed secure so that low security is sufficient. Low security means 
only one authentication method is required. If a user requests root 
access to the resource, high security is required as this kind of access 
motivates a high level of security. 
 
The combinations of circumstances, requested actions and resulting 
authentication factors is listed in Table 1. The access control is a Rule-
Based approach, as described in Section 3.2.  
 
TABLE 1: REQUIRED SECURITY LEVEL FOR COMBINATIONS OF CONTEXT AND 
ACTION 
Context Request Low Sec. High Sec. 
Normal 
working hours 
and 
on site 
 
default access 
 
 
 
 
Normal 
working hours 
and 
on site 
 
root access 
 
 
 
 
Outside 
working hours 
or 
off site 
 
default access 
 
 
 
 
Outside 
working hours 
or 
off site 
 
root access 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2  Architecture 
The proposed authentication scheme is described by a flow diagram 
shown in Figure 2. First, the system checks if the user is already 
authenticated either with default or with root access. If the user is 
neither, one factor is requested by the system. For our proof of concept 
implementation, we decided on a username-password combination that 
needs to be provided by the user. If the provided credentials are 
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incorrect, the authentication request is denied. Else, the context 
provided is checked. For the implementation presented in this work, 
location, based on IP and time, based on the authentication server time, 
are employed. If those context variables are during common working 
hours, or the location is outside the office area, a second factor, 
implemented as an OTP, is requested. If the context is plausible, but 
the user is requesting root permissions, an OTP is requested as a second 
factor as well. Furthermore, it is possible for a user with default access 
rights to request root permission after some time, if need be. The  
 
FIGURE 2: AUTHENTICATION MODEL ARCHITECTURE 
algorithm then requests the second factor only at that time and allows 
for an update of access rights. 
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4.3  Evaluation 
In this section, the exemplary implementation of the considered 
scenarios is presented. First, the used software components are 
explained in Subsection 4.3.1. After that, the behaviour of the presented 
implementation when faced with different conditions and scenarios is 
described in Subsection 4.3.2.  
 
4.3.1 Implementation 
The exemplary implementation has been done based on Remote 
Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) (Rigney et al. 2000). 
RADIUS is an open-source protocol used for authentication users in 
networks. There are implementations publicly available, making it easy 
to adapt. The libraries for user name-password-combinations are 
publicly available. For user name and password combination, the 
Password Authentication Protocol (PAP)-library was used. In case an 
OTP was needed, the Short Message Service OTP (SMSOTP) module 
was used. The structure of the authentication engine can be found in 
Figure 3. 
 
 
FIGURE 3: STRUCTURE OF THE AUTHENTICATION ENGINE 
RADIUS provides encryption for the transmission of passwords using 
PAP and SMSOTP. The algorithm, described in depth by Hill (2001), 
is based on a shared secret S. It is summarised in the following 
equation: 
 
𝑐1 =  𝑝1 ⨁ 𝑀𝐷5(𝑆 + 𝑅𝐴) 
𝑐2 =  𝑝2 ⨁ 𝑀𝐷5(𝑆 + 𝑐1) 
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… 
𝑐𝑛 =  𝑝𝑛 ⨁ 𝑀𝐷5(𝑆 + 𝑐𝑛−1) 
 
 
The cypher text blocks 𝑐𝑥 for x ∈ {1, ..., n} are concatenated and 
transmitted to the RADIUS server as the password-attribute. Cypher 
text block 𝑐𝑖 depends on cypher text block 𝑐𝑖−1, the first block 𝑐1 is 
initialised with a Request Authenticator RA, as described in the first 
line of Equation 1. The 𝑝𝑥  for x ∈ {1, ..., n} are 16-octet blocks of the 
user password. MD5 is a hashing algorithm. The presented RADIUS-
modules have been extended with modules that get the context on the 
server-side in order to determine the required security level. 
Furthermore, a module has been written that re-requests authentication 
if high security is demanded. This request demands a OTP. The 
resource to be authenticated to is an apache web-server (Apache 
Foundation 2018) that hosts documents. Default and root permissions 
can be granted to a user. 
 
4.3.2 Scenarios 
In order to evaluate the implementation, three different scenarios were 
considered. In the first scenario, low security access is considered. The 
authentication framework only requests user name and password. In 
the second and third scenario, high security is considered. The second 
scenario describes a user requesting root access to the resource, while 
the third scenario describes a user requesting default access, but with 
context information that requires an additional authentication factor. 
The information flow for standard and root authentication can be found 
in Figure 3. As the procedure remains the same, whether the user 
demands root access right away or demands it after some time, no 
specific scenario where the access rights are increased after some time 
is considered. 
 
First scenario: The user is prompted with a request for user name and 
password. After providing these, default access to the resource is 
granted. This flow can be seen in Figure 4 by omitting the part marked 
as “root access”. 
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Second scenario: The user is prompted with a request for user name 
and password. After providing these, the system figures that root access 
was requested that demands for high security. Therefore, a second 
factor is requested. After providing it, the user is granted root access to 
the resource. This is described as the full flow in Figure 4. 
 
FIGURE 4: AUTHENTICATION SEQUENCE 
 
Third scenario: The user is prompted with a request for user name and 
password. After providing these, the system checks the context 
variables and determines that high security is required. A second factor 
is requested. After providing it, the user is granted default access to the 
resource. This, as well, is described as the full flow in Figure 4. 
 
4.4  Discussion 
In this section, a model for context-based was introduced and 
evaluated. The extend is relatively simple, containing only two 
authorisation levels, namely standard and root, as well as two context 
factors, namely IP-based location and time. The implementation of this 
model shows the feasibility of the concept. There are advantages to the 
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proposed solution, as well as challenges that have not yet been 
addressed. First, RADIUS-based solutions are easy to implement and 
integrate, as it is a well-established tool for authentication with open 
source code, providing the possibility for extensions. Second, the 
context variables that have been employed are easily collected, keeping 
the additional effort small. No further sensors are needed to gather all 
information, as they are readily available.  
 
On the other hand, there are more novel solutions for authentication 
and authorisation available, addressing challenges that did not play a 
major role in the development of RADIUS, such as roaming in WLAN 
networks and authentication in untrusted networks. Furthermore, the context 
information can be spoofed with medium effort. IPSec and protocols can be 
used to secure the location factor. Additional information, such as hardware 
security tokens provide more flexibility and a high level of security as a 
second factor. However, they require additional hardware and 
implementation effort. Finally, the context variables that have been used are 
limited, there is an abundance of possible context that can be integrated into 
authentication solutions. Possible context information is discussed in Section 
5. 
 
From the authorisation point of view, a scenario with two roles, default and 
admin, is common for office, and sometimes home, use. However, to meet 
requirements of current industrial requirements, more roles are required. 
Furthermore, timing constraints and time-based access is important for 
actions that are scheduled in a predefined time. Categories of context factors, 
examples and factors that have been used in this work are listed in Table 2. 
 
TABLE 2: CONTEXT FACTORS 
Context Category Example Used in this work 
Time NTP-based, server-
based, host-based 
Server-based 
Location GPS, IP, Proximity, 
Wireless (WLAN, 
Bluetooth, …)  
IP 
Event Emergency, Condition - 
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Entity-based Histroy, Chain of 
Trust, 
Biometric/physical 
properties 
- 
5 Related Work 
In this section, related work in authentication is presented. Apart from 
the well-established classic authentication mechanisms as described in 
Section 3, there is ongoing research in the field of sound and secure 
authentication. Several works address the aspect of trust and 
computation of a trust level in authentication and access control. Bhatti 
et al. present a trust-based context-aware access control model for web-
services that address shortcomings of classic approaches (Bhatti et al. 
2004). Lima et al. compute trust, based on recommendations in mobile 
and pervasive environments to provide algorithms that meet demands 
in dynamic and security for mobile computation (Lima et al. 2011). 
Rene and Gellersen present a method to pair devices based on shaking 
them (Mayrhofer and Gellersen 2007). Furthermore, Mayrhofer 
worked on context-based authentication for spontaneous and 
ubiquitous devices (Mayrhofer 2006). In addition to single-factor 
authentication schemes, multi-factor authentication is a widely 
regarded topic in research, e.g. the work of Dasgputa et al. (2017). 
They provide an exhaustive overview over authentication processes 
and an extensive insight into the advances in this field. There are multi-
factor authentication schemes with certain policies, like the privacy-
preserving biometric authentication as presented by Bhargav-Spantzel 
et al. (2017). Many multi-factor authentication mechanisms address the 
issue of mobile and distributed devices and the resulting necessity of 
secure authentication. Glynos et al. present an approach for Mobile Ad 
Hoc Networks (MANETs) to prevent spoofing and impersonation 
attacks (Glynos et al. 2005). The importance of trust in MANETs as 
well as the difficulties in computing it is described in the work of 
Govindan and Mohaparta (2012). Huang et al. work on multi-factor 
authentication for fragile communications, e.g. when authentication 
servers are often unavailable (Huang et al. 2014). They address the 
problem of slow or unavailable remote authentication servers and 
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present an authentication protocol that speeds the authentication 
process with a remote entity up. The specific dangers of cloud 
computing are considered by Banyal et al. (2013). A framework 
consisting of authentication mechanisms that are compatible with 
established schemes and methods for access management is proposed. 
Aloul et al. present an approach that increased the level of 
authentication by using mobile phones, for applications such as 
banking (Aloul et al. 2009). Furthermore, as authentication and access 
control is employed in a variety of fields, from online banking to 
accessing one’s cell phone, some authentication processes are more 
critical than others. Jae-Jung and Seng-Phil present a method of 
assessing the risk and trustworthiness of authentication methods and 
provide insight as to when they provide a sufficient amount of security 
(Jae-Jung and Seng-Phil 2011). 
 
In addition to that, context-based authentication and access control is a 
widely regarded topic. It is addressed by Hulsebosch et al. (2005). They 
investigate the possibilities of access control based only on situational 
information. Furthermore, they explore the possibilities of providing 
anonymous services due to the obtained information. Kindberg and 
Zhang look into context authentication over constrained channels 
(Kindberg and Zhang 2001). They propose an algorithm to determine 
the position of a user based on physical channel information. Kinberg 
et al. present a model that derives context information about the 
location based on characteristics of the communication channel 
(Kindberg et al. 2002). Proximity awareness as a means of context is 
considered by Lenzini (2009) and Bardram et al. (2003). Bardram et 
al. focus explicitly on pervasive computing as a modern day challenge. 
They propose context awareness to determine a user’s location in order 
to grant or deny access.  Primo et al. propose a framework for context-
aware authentication based on the position a user holds the smartphone 
by extracting position information of the accelerometer (Primo et al. 
2014). Lenzini introduces a system that is aware of users in its 
proximity and able to identify and authenticate these users. 
Furthermore, a level of trust that the user is actually at the assumed 
position is calculated. Hayashi et al. propose a solution similar to the 
one implemented in this work. They use context information about the 
user, such as location, in order to determine security factors and select 
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the authentication scheme accordingly (Hayashi et al. 2013). A 
privacy-enhanced  access control scheme that optionally integrates 
context in pervasive environments is developed by Ren and Lou 
(2007). Hohlbein and Teufel address the issue of authorised persons 
misusing the system by introducing a role-based access control scheme 
that uses a need-to-know basis (Holbein and Teufel 1995). In addition 
to that, context information can be used to determine the security level 
of a network, as proposed by Duque Anton et al. (2017b), or to perform 
attribution of attacker types, as presented by Fraunholz et al. 
(Fraunholz et al. 2017a; Fraunholz et al. 2017c). 
 
The challenges faced by authentication and authorisation, as well as 
solutions proposed by works presented above are listed in Table 3. 
 
TABLE 3: CHALLENGES IN AUTHENTICATION AND AUTHORISATION 
Challenges Addressed 
Trust computation (Bhatti et al. 2004; Lima et al. 2011; 
Govindan and Mohapatra 2012) 
Authentication for 
critical services 
(Aloul et al. 2009) 
Multi-factor 
authentication for 
MANETs 
(Glynos et al. 2005; Govindan and 
Mohapatra 2012) 
Privacy-preserving 
multi-factor 
authentication 
(Bhargav-Spantzel et al. 2017) 
Multi-factor 
authentication for 
pervasive 
environments 
(Ren and Lou 2007; Mayrhofer 2006; 
Mayrhofer and Gellersen 2007; Banyal 
et al. 2013) 
Multi-factor 
authentication for 
fragile communication 
(Huang et al. 2014) 
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Risk assessment of 
authentication methods 
(Jae-Jung and Seng-Phil 2011) 
Context-aware 
authentication and 
authorisation 
(Holbein and Teufel 1995; Bardram et 
al. 2003; Kindberg et al. 2002; 
Hulsebosch et al. 2005; Mayrhofer and 
Gellersen 2007; Ren and Lou 2007; 
Lenzini 2009; Hayashi et al. 2013; 
Primo et al. 2014) 
Authorisation over 
constrained channels 
(Kindberg and Zhang 2001; Kindberg et 
al. 2002) 
Survey (Dasgupta et al. 2017) 
Context-aided intrusion 
detection 
(Fraunholz et al. 2017a; Fraunholz et al. 
2017b; Fraunholz et al. 2017c; Duque 
Anton et al. 2017b) 
 
 
6 Future Research Directions 
As a next step towards the integration of situational awareness into 
authentication solutions, different types of authentication factors will 
be evaluated. Especially interesting are factors that provide strong 
authentication, while needing no user interaction whatsoever. A worker 
in a factory, for example, that carries a tablet PC in order to wirelessly 
control devices, could be identified by a RFID-tag around his neck. If 
strong security is needed, the tabled PC could automatically scan his 
iris to get a second factor. Furthermore, physical attributes of devices 
or wireless channels can be used for strong, automated authentication 
and encryption (Lipps et al. 2018; Weinand et al. 2017). Furthermore, 
Integrating context into an aggregation model can aid in intrusion 
detection, especially for heterogeneous networks (Duque Anton et al. 
2017c). 
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7 Conclusion 
The presented context-based multi-factor authentication approach 
provides an additional level of security in comparison to standard 
authentication mechanisms as discussed in Section 3. For the 
exemplary implementation well-established authentication factors 
have been used. They could easily be extended or replaced in order to 
obtain on-demand security with strong authentication. The crucial 
point of the proposed framework is the flexibility and adaptability to 
different security standards. For less security critical tasks, one factor 
authentication is used, while more critical tasks require two factors. In 
the proposed framework, context information is considered in order to 
decide whether a task is critical or not, as the criticality also depends 
on the circumstances of the task. Especially the dynamic increase of 
access rights after providing a second factor makes this approach well 
suited for a dynamic environment. The principle of least needed access 
rights applies, so that the second factor is only necessary if the policy 
demands it. Several existing technologies were combined in order to 
keep the system easy-to-use, while still capable to adapt to the 
environment. 
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KEY TERMS 
 Context: Information about the conditions and current status of an 
environment 
 Identification: The claim an entity makes about its identity 
 Authentication: The process of proving an identity towards a 
system 
 Multi-factor Authentication: The process of using different 
mechanisms at once to prove identity towards a system with a 
higher security  
 Strong Authentication: The process of proving the identity towards 
a system by using independent authentication mechanisms 
 Authorisation: The process of providing access rights to a resource 
by an authority based on a set of rules. 
 Industrial Internet of Things: A concept that builds on 
interconnectivity and distributed computation to increase flexibility 
and productivity of industrial applications and to reduce cost and 
maintenance 
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